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WHY THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
CANNOT PROTECT AGAINST 
HEALTH CARE DATA BREACHES 
KRISTEN HEALD* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 4, 2015, millions of Anthem health insurance customers were 
notified that their personal information might have been accessed in a massive 
data hack on the nation’s second-largest health insurer.1 The hackers might have 
obtained the names, birthdays, social security numbers, street addresses, and em-
ployment information of as many as eighty million customers.2 A little over a 
month later, the health insurance company Premera Blue Cross announced a data 
breach that exposed the medical and financial data of as many as eleven million 
customers.3  
In the first half of 2015 alone, the healthcare sector suffered 187 data 
breaches that compromised the medical records of eighty-four million patients, 
and accounted for 21.1% of all breaches worldwide.4 This wave of high-profile 
cyber attacks on healthcare organizations marks the beginning of data security 
breaches, as hackers continue to set their sights on the healthcare industry.5 
Health organizations are an ideal target for hackers looking for large amounts of 
valuable information.6 On the black market, credit card information can sell for 
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as little as one to two dollars per account whereas medical data can fetch around 
fifty dollars per record.7 Credit cards can be quickly cancelled if stolen, but med-
ical identity theft is extremely hard to fix, difficult to detect, and much more 
damaging.8  
Federal legislation like the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (“HIPAA”) and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clin-
ical Health Act (“HITECH”) created federal standards for the handling and use 
of protected health information (“PHI”) and provided incentives for the acceler-
ated adoption of electronic health records (“EHRs”) for patients to help doctors 
share patient data.9 Although these federal compliance programs were meant to 
improve healthcare security, the rush to adopt EHR systems in accordance with 
the federal guidelines has not been coupled with adequate security measures, 
leaving medical data vulnerable to data breaches.10 There is no federal law that 
mandates specific security procedures that industries must follow, and health 
care organizations have been more focused on delivering health care rather than 
operational security.11  
Health care data risks and potential data and monetary losses will force en-
tities to reassess their insurance policies and coverage for data breaches. The 
ambiguity of traditional coverage directed policyholders to look toward cyber 
security insurance, a newly emerging market tailored specifically to cyber 
risks.12 Because cyberattacks can be unpredictable and costs of data breaches can 
be difficult to surmount, cyber security insurance can be expensive.13 Data 
breaches have not only prompted insurers to increase premiums, but to also raise 
deductibles and limit coverage for some companies.14  
This Comment proposes a solution to this crisis, specifically that the federal 
government should establish a transitional reinsurance program to cover the risks 
taken by cyber insurance companies to encourage insurers to compete in the new 
market and result in more affordable premiums. In addition to a risk-shifting 
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framework, the government should also act as a risk reducer by providing incen-
tives to promote positive behavior that reduces the overall risk posed by data 
breaches. Part II will explore the financial burden of data breaches on health care 
organizations. Part III will assess the current state of insurance coverage for data 
breaches as distinguished between commercial general liability insurance and 
cyber insurance. Part IV will discuss why the current framework for protection 
against data breaches is failing. Finally, Part V will propose legislative solutions 
aimed at solving this problem. 
II. FINANCIAL BURDEN OF DATA BREACHES 
A. Federal Regulatory Framework  
Overtime, federal legislation has adapted to change the scope and probabil-
ity of health care risks and the potential liability faced by HIPAA compliant en-
tities.15 Enforcement for HIPAA breach violations may result in massive penalty 
payments and drastic increases to the expenses born by the violating organiza-
tions.16 
On August 21, 1996, Congress passed the HIPAA to instigate widespread 
reform within the health care industry.17 Two significant goals of HIPAA aimed 
at curbing the costs of the health insurance industry by reducing health care fraud 
and creating administrative simplification provisions to encourage the electronic 
transmission of health information.18 Recognizing the need to protect patients’ 
medical data in light of electronic advances in health information, Congress in-
cluded provisions within HIPAA that required the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services (“HHS”) to adopt national standards concerning the privacy and 
security of protected health information PHI.19 In 2000, HHS published a Privacy 
Rule that set national standards for the protection of the confidentiality of health 
information and focused on the individual’s right to control the use of his or her 
information.20 The rule applied to three types of entities: health plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and most health care providers.21 In 2003, HHS also published a 
 
 15. Arden B. Levy et al., Data Breaches in Health Care: New or Heightened Risks, Emerging Insur-
ance and Legal Considerations, ABA SECT. OF LITIG. 2–4 (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2014_inscle_materials/written_materi-
als/b10_1_data_breaches_in_health_care.authcheckdam.pdf, 
 16. Id. at 7. 
 17. Deborah Buckman, Validity, Construction, and Application of Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 194 A.L.R. FED. 133 
(2004). 
 18. Id.  
 19. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HIPAA FOR PROFESSIONALS, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/index.html (last visited Nov.29, 2017). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
  
2018] INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE DATA BREACHES 273 
Security Rule that required the use of appropriate administrative and technical 
safeguards to ensure the security of electronic PHI.22 The Department of Health 
and Human Services Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) enforces HIPAA through a 
complaint and investigation process, statutorily mandated audits, fines, and pen-
alties.23  
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(“HITECH”) was passed as a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (“ARRA”).24 HITECH strengthened HIPAA Privacy and Security 
Rules by adding a breach notification requirement and enhancing penalties for 
violations.25 The HITECH Act also “granted State attorney generals the authority 
to enforce HIPAA rules by bringing civil actions on behalf of state residents in 
federal district court.”26  
Important modifications to both HITECH and HIPAA were made with the 
effectuation of HHS’s Omnibus Rule on March 26, 2013.27 The Omnibus Rule 
made a number of changes that broadened liability of health organizations, in-
creased penalties for violations, and changed the standards for what constitutes 
a breach.28 The new rule changed the scope of liability to make not only health 
care providers directly liable to HIPAA Privacy and Security requirements, but 
to make their business associates directly liable, as well.29 Business associates 
are defined in the Omnibus Rule as a “person who ‘creates, receives, maintains, 
or transmits’ protected health information on behalf of a covered entity.”30 The 
rule introduced circumstances under which covered entities may be liable for a 
HIPAA violation based on the conduct of their business associates.31 The federal 
common law of agency is used to determine culpability and turns on the right or 
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authority of the health provider to control the business associate’s conduct in the 
course of performing a service on its behalf.32  
Another important aspect of the 2013 Omnibus Rule was its amendment to 
the Breach Notification Rule for Unsecured Protected Health Information set un-
der HITECH.33 HITECH defined a breach as the “unauthorized acquisition, ac-
cess, use or disclosure of protected health information which compromises the 
security or privacy of such information.”34 The rule required a finding that “com-
promise[ed]” data posed a “significant risk of financial, reputational, or other 
harm to the individual.”35 If this harm standard was met, health care providers 
were required to notify patients of the breach.36  
The Omnibus Rule eliminated the “significant risk of harm” standard and 
moved toward a more stringent presumption of harm standard.37 The new regu-
lations presume a breach whenever PHI is acquired, accessed, used or disclosed 
in a way that violates the Privacy Rule.38 The breach must be reported unless the 
covered entity demonstrates that there is a “low probability the protected health 
information has been compromised.”39 The risk assessment focuses on four fac-
tors: 1) the nature and extent of the PHI involved; 2) the unauthorized person 
who used the PHI or to whom the disclosure was made; 3) whether the PHI was 
actually acquired or viewed; and 4) the extent to which the risk to PHI has been 
mitigated.40 In bringing about this change, HHS explained, in the preface to the 
Omnibus Rule, that the previous harm standard was too subjective and set too 
high a bar for triggering breach notification.41  
The Omnibus Rule significantly increased the risk and scope of culpability 
on the part of health care providers for breach notification and for the actions of 
their business associates. In addition to this heavy burden, the rule also increased 
the amount of civil penalties for HIPAA violations, which start at $100 per vio-
lation and increase up to $50,000 per violation, with a yearly maximum of $1.5 
million, depending on the nature of the violation.42 There are four categories of 
violations reflecting increasing levels of culpability and the corresponding pen-
alty amounts for each.43 The baseline for a violation is establishing the covered 
entity did not know or have reason to know of the violation, despite exercising 
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reasonable diligence.44 The highest culpability for a violation is established when 
it is shown the violation was due to willful neglect and not timely corrected.45  
B. Cost Breakdown 
Calculating the cost of a data breach is not a straightforward process. The 
financial repercussions are just coming to light in the industry, and it might take 
years to assess the full impact of any given incident.46 Financial penalties are 
being issued with increasing frequency to health care organizations for HIPAA 
violations and reports of breaches continue to rise.47 The value of PHI on the 
black market and the inability of customers to change information, like social 
security numbers and street addresses once stolen, makes curing a breach that 
much harder to resolve.48 Researchers have calculated the average cost of a 
breach in 2015 at $363 per medical record.49 Breaches in health care are the most 
expensive to remediate and are only growing more costly.50 In the U.S. 
healthcare industry, the average cost of a breach is $398 per medical record.51 
This sum is far higher than the average cost of a data breach across most other 
industries at $154 per record.52 Moreover, data breaches cost the healthcare sys-
tem an estimated $6 billion annually.53 Many costs are hard to predict and are 
dependent on the size of the breach; however, it is extremely important to calcu-
late potential loss in order to assess the type of coverage needed.54  
According to the HIPAA Journal, there are a variety of different sources of 
costs that organizations should be aware of when calculating the financial impact 
of a data breach.55 First is the cost of a breach investigations, in which an external 
organization must investigate to identify the the cause and source of the breach.56 
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In the case of a breach, the OCR oversees the organization’s spending of reme-
diation costs, which go into implementing the safeguards that should have been 
in place initially to prevent the breach.57 Temporary operational changes after a 
breach require spending on issuing notifications, answering customer questions, 
updating social media sites, and implementing new safeguards.58 Breach notifi-
cation requirements mandate that letters must be issued to all affected individuals 
by first class mail at a current cost of forty-nine cents per letter.59 The HIPAA 
Journal estimates that one letter issued to all individuals affected by the breach 
could cost Anthem $40 million in postage costs alone.60  
The HHS included in the Omnibus Rule a summary of annual breach noti-
fication compliance costs in 2011 indicating it totaled $14,475,600.61 These costs 
include: E-mail and first class mail ($3,467,122); Substitute Notices: Media No-
tice ($571,200); Substitute Notices: Toll-Free Number ($1,816,379); Imputed 
Cost to Affected Individuals Who Call the Toll-Free Line ($2,042,665); Notice 
to Media of Breach: Over 500 People ($15,420); Report to HHS: 500 or More 
($15,420); Investigation Costs: Under 500 ($5,277,456); Investigation Costs: 
500 or More ($837,500); and Annual Report to the Secretary ($422,438).62 Con-
sequently, the larger the number of individuals affected from a breach, the higher 
these breach notification costs will be.  
HIPAA requires that entities provide free identity theft and credit monitor-
ing services to all individuals affected for one to two years after the breach.63 
This is estimated to cost $10 per individual, per month.64 As previously dis-
cussed, regulatory fines issued by the OCR are another source of expenses that 
can cost as much as $1.5 million per year, per violation.65 According to the HHS 
website, the highest fine ever issued was in 2014 to New York Presbyterian Hos-
pital/Columbia University Medical Center for $4.8 million in violations.66 The 
electronic PHI of 6,800 patients was impermissibly disclosed to Google.67 An 
alternate source of regulatory fines can come from Attorney Generals, who have 
the authority to assist the OCR in enforcing HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.68 
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HITECH authorizes State Attorney Generals to impose fines up to $25,000 per 
violation category, per year.69 Another cost that may often be unforeseeable to 
an organization is the loss of business or reputation.70 A Ponemon study found 
that the healthcare industry has one of the highest customer churn rates (measure 
of patients who discontinue service) at six percent, which suggests that the 
healthcare industry could reduce data breach costs by putting more emphasis on 
customer retention.71 
Finally, class-action lawsuits can be a huge source of loss for providers in 
the wake of a breach.72 Three lawsuits were filed against Anthem less then 
twenty-four hours after the breach announcement.73 Shortly after, a woman 
claiming $5,000,000 in damages filed a class action suit against Anthem.74 
Health care data breach lawsuits typically claim damages of $1,000 per victim.75 
However, as in Anthem’s case, these estimates could greatly exceed that amount 
in cases where a large number of patients have been harmed. These exorbitant 
costs will only continue to rise in the wake of enhanced federal enforcement, 
increased fines and penalties, broader liability, and larger scale data breaches that 
affect millions of patients. It is increasingly important for health care entities to 
have appropriate insurance coverage to help mitigate the potentially devastating 
impact of a data breach. 
Data breaches are unquestionably expensive and one would think that the 
cost alone would incentivize companies to improve practices and safeguard pa-
tient data. The Anthem data breach is estimated to cost well over $100 million.76 
To any small business, those costs would be devastating. However, to the multi-
billion dollar company, the cost of $100 million (much of which would be offset 
by insurance) is a mere .01% of its annual revenue.77 To large corporations like 
Anthem, the cost and effort to improve security defenses is simply not worth it.78 
This point is important to factor in when considering remedies that not only take 
on economic risk but also incentivize companies to invest in security solutions 
across the board.  
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III. INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR DATA BREACHES 
A. Traditional Insurance Coverage 
Insurance manages risk and provides financial compensation in the event 
of a loss. Understanding the financial impact of a data breach allows an organi-
zation to choose coverage that will most effectively mitigate these losses and 
risks. A Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) policy is the traditional insur-
ance policy issued to business organizations to protect against liability for claims 
of bodily injury, property damage, and advertising and personal injury liability.79 
This is the most common type of insurance policy and is the first place policy-
holders look when determining coverage.80 Data breach coverage disputes focus 
on Coverage A: Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability and Coverage B: 
Personal and Advertising Injury Liability offered under a CGL policy.81 The de-
bate stems from whether there is “property damage” or “personal injury” in data 
breach cases.82 
The term “property damage” under Coverage A most often requires physi-
cal damage to “tangible property” and specifically excludes coverage for soft-
ware, data, or information stored in an electronic format.83 More often than not, 
courts will decline to extend coverage of “tangible property” to electronic data, 
unless there is physical damage or loss of use of a tangible product, like a com-
puter.84 
Under Coverage B, “personal injury” is defined to include “oral or written 
publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person’s right of pri-
vacy.”85 CGL coverage for data breaches under “personal injury” largely centers 
on if there has been a “publication” of the compromised information that would 
warrant coverage.86 Courts have struggled with the definition of “publication” 
over the years and have made contradictory rulings about whether CGL policies 
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extend coverage to data breaches on this basis.87 Zurich American Insurance v. 
Sony Corp. of America88 was a 2014 data breach case in which the Court found 
that there was no coverage available to Sony under its CGL policy.89 The hack 
stole the personal information of tens of millions of Sony PlayStation users and 
Sony sought coverage under the “personal injury” component of its CGL policy, 
arguing that the breach constituted a “publication” of private information.90 The 
Court found that a CGL policy requires the policyholder to actually commit the 
act, and since hackers, and not Sony, perpetrated the “publication” of information 
here, it therefore did not qualify for coverage.91 Since Zurich, the general con-
sensus seems to be that CGL policies provide little to no coverage for liabilities 
resulting from data breaches.92 
Recognizing the confusion in courts over CGL coverage and the increasing 
risks of data breaches, Insurance Services Office Inc. (“ISO”), which develops 
standard insurance contract language, released an exclusion expressly limiting 
Coverage A and B to exclude coverage “for injury or damage arising out of any 
access to or disclosure of any person’s or organization’s confidential or personal 
information, including patents, trade secrets, processing methods, customer lists, 
financial information, credit card information, health information or any other 
type of nonpublic information.”93 Moreover, “the exclusion will apply even if 
damages are claimed for notification costs, credit monitor expenses . . . or any 
other loss . . . incurred . . . with respect to that which is subject to the exclu-
sion.”94 Provisions such as these, as well as the general inapplicability of tradi-
tional CGL coverage to data breaches, has demonstrated a need to transfer risk 
from traditional lines to a more specific product tailored to cyber policies.  
 
 87. Jana Landon, Where Does Sony Settlement Leave CGL Insurance for Data Breaches?, LEGAL 
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B. Cyber Insurance 
As insurers and courts are increasingly reluctant to extend CGL coverage 
to data breaches, it should come as no surprise that standalone cyber security 
policies are on the rise.95 As more high-profile cyber attacks happen, health or-
ganizations are increasing their investment in cyber insurance to help mitigate 
their risk exposure in the case of a breach.96 Healthcare entities increased their 
cyber spending to forty-one percent in 2015.97 An estimated $2 billion worth of 
health-related cyber insurance was sold in 2014, and the market is growing at 
twenty to twenty-five percent per year.98  
A robust cybersecurity insurance market would help reduce cyber attacks 
by promoting the adoption of better security practices in exchange for more cov-
erage and lower rates.99 Policyholders could devote more resources to their cy-
bersecurity infrastructure and actively work to improve the quality of data col-
lection and monitor cyber threats.100 Insurers could offer reduced premiums to 
those seeking coverage if they take steps to decrease the extent of the insurer’s 
liability, which would increase competition and lower market prices.101 This 
could shift the focus of health care organizations to the value of security imple-
mented, rather than simply complying with baseline protocols. A healthy, com-
petitive cyber insurance market could provide a fluid system to minimize damage 
and recovery time in the aftermath of a data breach.  
However, despite increasing demand for cyber insurance, this ideal model 
of a competitive, affordable market has yet to be achieved. A standardized as-
sessment of cyber risk does not yet exist.102 The relatively new market for cyber 
insurance creates a difficult risk to price by traditional insurance methods since 
there is a lack of actuarial data available.103 The unpredictable probability and 
nature of data breaches, paired with the unknown impact of long-term financial 
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loss, makes it extremely hard for insurers to adequately assess actual risks for a 
given company and leaves them unprepared for a catastrophic cyber event.104 
Typically, insurance companies purchase reinsurance from other insurance com-
panies to spread risk and limit the total loss the original insurer would experience 
in the event of a disaster.105  
The rise of data breaches has prompted insurers to significantly increase 
cyber premiums and deductibles while capping coverage at $100 million.106 
Some estimates conclude that a company may need as much as $1 billion in cyber 
insurance to protect its assets, but most companies will be unable to secure more 
than $300 million.107 Health insurance companies that have experienced a data 
breach seem to be hit the hardest, with some premiums tripling on renewal.108 
Anthem ran into difficulties renewing its coverage in the aftermath of the data 
breach, managing to get $100 million in coverage, but only with a $25 million 
deductible.109 High-profile data hacks are finally giving insurers a little insight 
into the financial impact of a breach, and the results are devastating.110 The high 
cost of cyber security insurance may put health care companies in the position of 
choosing between spending money on cyber insurance or investing those funds 
into better cyber security infrastructure.111  
IV. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK IS FAILING 
The rise of data breaches exposed the failure of existing safeguards and 
mechanisms to not only protect against these risks, but to prevent them from 
reoccurring in the future. Cyber insurance coverage will not, in itself, fully miti-
gate the risk posed by data breaches. As previously mentioned, for large compa-
nies like Anthem, the cost of a data breach amounted to a mere .01% of its annual 
revenue.112 Most corporations in this position would rather write off the losses 
than spend two to three times that on heightened security measures.113 From a 
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purely financial perspective, the possibility of a massive data breach is quite rare, 
so improving data security practices seems like a waste of money.114  
There is little to no incentive for health care organizations to invest in dig-
ital security as a proactive approach to preventing data breaches.115 Cyber insur-
ance coverage is a reactive protection measure that bears part of the risk, but does 
nothing to motivate health entities to reduce the risk firsthand.116 This is a classic 
moral hazard problem, meaning that when financially protected through insur-
ance, an individual’s motives and behavior to prevent loss are reduced, resulting 
in an increased probability of loss.117 Risk transfer can either lead to more risky 
behaviors, or incentivize positive behaviors through the implementation of pre-
vention measures.118 Thus, any realistic remedy to the data breach problem must 
reallocate economic risk to kick-start the cyber insurance market and incentivize 
cyber insurers to effectuate security measures to reduce overall risk.  
V. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
A. Federal Government Reinsurance Program 
The federal government as reinsurer could help stimulate and prioritize the 
cyber insurance market. The infancy of the market for cyber insurance impedes 
its growth as an industry due to a scarcity of data and a high level of uncertainty 
that causes insurers to raise premiums and lower coverage.119 Coverage limits 
should encompass a majority of a policyholder’s loss; however, uncertainty as to 
the full extent of loss means there are many indirect effects from cyber losses 
that cannot be measured and thus not covered.120  
A transitional federal reinsurance program could subsidize insurance costs 
and help the market remain afloat until cyber reinsurers can get a better sense of 
data and risk for more affordable premiums.121 This could increase the supply of 
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cyber insurance, reduce prices, and increase competition in the market.122 Guar-
anteed reinsurance for a breach from the federal government could make insurers 
feel more secure in offering large amounts of cyber insurance coverage to those 
companies that need it.123 Ultimately, insurance companies need to know more 
about the likelihood of a breach, how breaches should be valued, and how to 
measure the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk management strategies designed 
to address them.124 A reinsurance program could promote the security insurance 
companies’ need to join and compete in the market and create time in which 
relevant actuarial data can be developed until enough information exists for the 
market to be able to fully stand on its own.125  
The federal government acting as a reinsurer of last resort in the event of 
catastrophic loss is not a new concept.126 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 
2002 (“TRIA”), administered by the U.S. Department of Treasury, created a tem-
porary federal reinsurance program that, in the event of a major terrorist attack, 
allows the insurance industry and federal government to share losses.127 TRIA 
offers a measure of certainty to the insurance industry as to the maximum size of 
losses insurers would have to pay and is triggered when losses exceed a certain 
amount.128 The law has had positive effects on the insurance market, with 
roughly sixty percent of commercial policyholders purchasing coverage over the 
past few years and generally pushing prices for terrorism insurance downward.129  
However, it is important to note that TRIA was meant to be a “temporary” 
subsidy program while the financial services industry developed the “systems, 
mechanisms, products, and programs necessary to create a viable . . . market for 
private terrorism risk insurance.”130 The Act was originally set to expire in 2005, 
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but has been renewed three times since, most recently in January 2015 for an-
other six years after Congress allowed it to expire on December 31, 2014.131 
Critics of the Act point out the program’s shifting of the potential costs of terror-
ist losses from businesses to taxpayers.132 Others argue that continued federal 
involvement in terrorism insurance is hindering the private insurance market 
from developing capabilities to be able to handle this risk on its own.133 The 
Department of Treasury cautioned the public about renewing the program, “not-
ing that it was meant to be temporary, and urging more reliance on the private 
sector.”134 
The National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”), while not a federal rein-
surance program, provides an example of federal government intervention aimed 
at filling a gap in the insurance market.135 In 1968, Congress created the NFIP to 
help provide flood insurance to property owners.136 The catastrophic effects of 
floods were causing enormous losses to life and property, and the only financial 
recourse available to victims was in disaster assistance.137 Private insurance com-
panies could not provide flood insurance coverage at an affordable price due its 
devastating nature and the lack of an actuarial rate structure to reflect the risk.138  
The NFIP, administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(“FEMA”), is a voluntary program through which participating communities 
agree to adopt and enforce regulation of floodplain development to reduce future 
flood damages.139 In return, property owners within a participating community 
may elect to purchase federally backed flood insurance.140 FEMA works closely 
with more than eighty private insurance companies to offer flood insurance to 
these communities at nationally established (below-market) rates.141 The revenue 
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collected from the purchased policies help to pay for claims, but when claims 
exceed revenues, the NFIP is authorized to borrow from the U.S. Treasury.142  
While the NFIP has undoubtedly reduced claims from flood risk and future 
damages by increasing preparedness standards and flood insurance adoption, fi-
nancial concerns led the U.S. General Accounting Office to determine that the 
program is not actuarially sound.143 This suggests that premiums collected for 
policies are insufficient to serve as a reserve for paying out potential catastrophic 
losses.144 The subsidized premiums offered under the NFIP do not actually re-
flect the risk associated with properties, and they resulted in net annual losses as 
high as $600 million.145 NFIP borrowed billions of dollars from the Treasury 
Department to cover claims from devastating natural disasters, like Hurricane 
Katrina, and by 2014, the continued borrowing caused the program to incur a 
total of $23 billion in debt.146 One of the possible solutions proposed to remedy 
this debt is to keep the federal government as the primary line of flood insurance, 
but to pay a reinsurance premium to the private sector to take on losses exceeding 
a loss amount or based on particular flood disaster size.147 
The final and most recent precedent for federal government reinsurance can 
be found in the 2010 Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).148 The ACA is a compre-
hensive health reform law aimed at providing more affordable healthcare, ex-
panding coverage, and improving the health care delivery system.149 The law 
requires most U.S. citizens to enroll in health insurance plans and requires states 
to establish health insurance exchanges, through which private insurers sell 
plans, in compliance with ACA regulations.150 Enrollees whose household in-
come falls between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty level can receive fed-
eral premium subsidies on plans purchased through these state exchanges.151  
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The ACA brought a big change to how insurers offered plans in that it pro-
hibits insurers from denying coverage to people, excluding pre-existing condi-
tions or varying premiums based on health status.152 Not knowing how many 
people will enroll, or the proportion of sick beneficiaries, creates more uncer-
tainty and larger risk for insurance providers in this new market.153 To improve 
incentives for insurers to participate and limit the amount an insurance company 
can lose in the marketplace, the ACA created three risk-sharing programs: a per-
manent risk adjustment program, a temporary risk-corridor program, and a tran-
sitional reinsurance program.154  
The permanent risk adjustment program aims to reduce incentives for 
health insurance plans to enroll people with higher than average costs. This is 
achieved by having plans with lower than average actuarial risk make payments 
to those plans whose individuals have higher than average risk.155 The HHS or 
state exchanges assess the actuarial risk of the insurance pool within each plan 
and compare it to the average of all the plans in the state in order to shift the 
money accordingly.156  
The temporary risk corridors program mitigates pricing uncertainty (of who 
will enroll and what their health spending will be) by sharing gains and losses 
between plans and the federal government.157 Actual claims are compared to ex-
pected claims assumed in the insurer’s premiums.158 If actual claims exceed or 
fall below expected claims by more or less than three percent, HHS will either 
reimburse the plan for at least fifty percent of excess loss, or the plan will pay 
HHS at least fifty percent of the excess gained.159  
The risk corridor program was not originally required to be budget neutral; 
however, the 2015 Cromnibus Bill mandated that “2014 risk corridors receiva-
bles paid in 2015 be funded through payables into the program from other insur-
ers.”160 This legislation came after 2014 insurance premiums had already been 
set and when most insurers “anticipated receiving full payment for the money 
the government owed under the risk corridors program.”161 The result is a “$2.5 
billion shortfall between the money taken in under the program and the money 
 
 152. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, FACT SHEET: ACA RISK-SHARING MECHANISMS 1 (2013).  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Boothe & La Couture, supra note 148. 
 157. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 152, at 2.  
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Scott Katterman, Headwinds Cause 2014 Risk Corridor Funding Shortfall, MILLIMAN (Oct. 5, 
2015), http://us.milliman.com/insight/2015/Headwinds-cause-2014-risk-corridor-funding-shortfall/.  
 161. Seth Chandler, Bad News for ObamaCare: Insurers Lost a Lot of Money in 2014, ACA DEATH 
SPIRAL (Oct. 2, 2015), http://acadeathspiral.org/2015/10/02/bad-news-for-obamacare-insurers-lost-a-lot-
of-money-in-2014/.  
  
2018] INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE DATA BREACHES 287 
owed to those who lost money.”162 Insurers would receive only 12.5% of what 
they thought they would receive in 2014.163  
The transitional reinsurance plan helps stabilize premiums in early years 
and reduces incentives for insurers to avoid high-cost individuals by providing 
reinsurance payments to individuals whose medical costs reach a threshold cost, 
which was $70,000 in 2015.164 Reinsurance payments stop when the individual’s 
costs reach $250,000.165 The federal government will reimburse the plan for at 
least fifty percent of the claims cost between the threshold cost and cap in 
2015.166 Funding for the reinsurance program comes from fees levied on all 
health insurance plans, and HHS can adjust payments to ensure that payments do 
not exceed contributions collected.167 Contributions and reimbursements from 
the program will decline until the program expires and allows insurers to price 
their premiums ten to fifteen percent lower in the new marketplace.168 
What the cyber security insurance market needs to function in the market 
and what government-sponsored reinsurance offers are one and the same: lower 
premiums and reduction of risk.169 The need for a temporary reinsurance pro-
gram will reduce once insurers gain sufficient experience in the market.170 Rein-
surance, as best exemplified through ACA and TRIA, is a risk-shifting mecha-
nism that reallocates risks away from the most vulnerable parties.171 This type of 
risk management will facilitate the widespread availability and affordability of 
cyber insurance coverage in the marketplace.  
Modeling cyber reinsurance after the TRIA could ensure that the govern-
ment does not completely take over the risk, as insurers are still responsible for 
modest deductibles.172 Also, the temporary nature of the TRIA could stimulate 
market solutions as opposed to the more permanent NFIP model in which the 
government, acting as primary insurer, sets its own premiums unrelated to risk 
and leaves no room for the market to develop on its own.173 A transitional gov-
ernment reinsurance program would have to differ from the TRIA; however, in 
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that it needs to truly be temporary and not constantly renewed.174 Because the 
TRIA model does not charge premiums to be eligible, the costs are borne by the 
taxpayers subject to recoupment.175 This is often a criticism of the continuing 
nature of the program, as it only extends the burden on the public taxpayers.176  
The danger of having the federal government charge premiums for reinsur-
ance is that the risk of cyber insurance is still not known, and providing low 
premiums that do not correctly reflect the risk will leave the program in massive 
debt.177 It would be wise to stick with the TRIA model of not charging premiums, 
since even on occasions that a premium is charged for government intervention, 
the premium does not actually reflect the risk.178 The ACA does not charge pre-
miums for its reinsurance, but requires health insurance upon which it charges 
fees to help reinsure the risk and lower premium prices in the new market.179 
Requiring mandatory cyber insurance on organizations is too drastic a solution 
and an extremely complicated undertaking that may not be the fairest solution.180  
While the TRIA model promotes cyber insurance coverage by shifting un-
predictable and catastrophic economic risks to the government, a preventive risk-
reducing model must also be incorporated to avert the likelihood and magnitude 
of said risks in the future. The National Flood Insurance Program most closely 
resembles a risk prevention framework. In order to qualify for flood insurance, a 
community must adopt floodplain management regulations and ordinances to re-
duce the risk and consequences of serious flooding.181 “Flood damage is de-
creased by almost $1 billion a year through community enforcement of flood-
plain management” requirements and buildings “constructed in agreement with 
NFIP building standards experience about 80% less damage.”182 The NFIP must 
be distinguished in that the federal government acts as a primary insurer rather 
than reinsurer.183 In the field of cyber security, the objective is not to completely 
eradicate the private insurance market, but to help stabilize it until it can function 
on its own. The preventative idea of the NFIP, however, could be incorporated 
 
 174. Katz, supra note 130.  
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Bruggeman et al., supra note 172, at 202, 240. 
 178. Id. at 238.  
 179. Boothe & La Couture, supra note 148. 
 180. Debra Shinder, Cyber-Insurance: Is It Necessary? Should It Be Mandatory? GFI BLOG (Dec. 4, 
2014), http://www.gfi.com/blog/cyber-insurance-is-it-necessary-should-it-be-mandatory/ (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2017). 
 181. NAT’L FLOOD INS. PROGRAM, ABOUT THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: MAKING 
COMMUNITIES SAFER, https://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/about/making_communi-
ties_safer.jsp (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).  
 182. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENV’T, FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT, http://doee.dc.gov/service/floodplain-
management (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).  
 183. Id. 
  
2018] INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE DATA BREACHES 289 
within a reinsurance framework to help cure the incentive problem in the 
healthcare industry.  
The ideal federal program would act both as a risk shifter and risk re-
ducer.184 Federal reinsurance for a data breach would be triggered by a threshold 
amount of loss. Since most insurance coverage for cyber security currently caps 
at $100 to 300 million, the baseline for qualifying for federal funds should start 
at least around this number. The insurance industry will still be responsible for 
paying for a certain amount of the losses through deductibles (the amount an 
insurer must pay before the federal program kicks in) and copayments (the 
amount insurers must pay above their individual deductibles).185 It is hard to say 
how long this program will be needed, but if the law must be renewed, the thresh-
old amount of loss should become higher each time, along with the percentage 
of deductibles and copayments for which the insurer is responsible.186  
However, unlike TRIA, this federal reinsurance would not kick in for any 
data breach that exceeds a certain amount. The insurer must be eligible for fed-
eral reinsurance to qualify. The federal government could incentivize insurers to 
require policyholders to comply with minimum security standards as a condition 
of coverage, or adoption of a framework formulated by the government. On the 
condition that insurers promote these preventative measures to their policyhold-
ers, they would be eligible for federal reinsurance in the event of a massive data 
breach. This would avoid a moral hazard problem and instead, promote risk 
transfer as a means of positively influencing risk-reduction behavior.187  
B.  Increased Regulation and Guidance 
The federal government classifies the strengthening of cyber security and 
data as “one of the most important challenges we face as a Nation.”188 One of the 
biggest impediments to the maturation of the cyber insurance market is the scar-
city of data and unknown certainty of the risk.189 Information sharing about cyber 
risks and the magnitude and loss impact of actual data breaches would help ac-
celerate the growth of the insurance market.190 The issue with information shar-
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ing is that private organizations are concerned that “voluntarily sharing infor-
mation [with the government] will expose them to significant sources of potential 
liability.”191  
The rise of data breaches and cyber hacks has put pressure on lawmakers 
to address information security.192 In October 2015, the Senate passed the Cy-
bersecurity Information Sharing Act (“CISA”) to give companies legal immunity 
for sharing private data with the federal government.193 If a company gets hit 
with a specific type of hack, the federal government would receive an alert and 
immediately warn other companies and help strengthen cyber defenses.194 Critics 
are concerned with provisions in the bill that allow the Department of Homeland 
Security to share information gathered with other government agencies, seem-
ingly endorsing a surveillance agenda that benefits the intelligence commu-
nity.195 CISA includes privacy guards to ensure companies wipe customer spe-
cific data before handing information to the government, but there are still 
worries that companies, in a hurry, might not remove all patient specific data 
before sharing information with the government.196  
The bill still needs to be reconciled with two information-sharing bills 
passed in the House, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (“PCNA”) and the Na-
tional Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act (“NCPAA”), before it be-
comes law.197 The need for government direction on information sharing is cru-
cial to heightening security defenses.198 The difficulty will be in how to 
accomplish security without infringing on privacy interests.199 To truly promote 
security, any legislation aimed at information sharing must be narrowly tailored 
to include only that information needed for securing systems, be solely used for 
that purpose, and clean of any identifying personal information.200  
In addition to information sharing, there is a need for increased guidance 
for development of a cyber security infrastructure. The healthcare industry needs 
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better guidance for use and protection of health data.201 The federal government 
should be involved in defining metrics and setting data security requirements, or 
at least minimum standards, insurers can use to qualify companies for cyber in-
surance policies.202 Information sharing would only help the government better 
define industry standards and best practices to help organizations manage cyber 
security risk.203 
In 2013, the President issued Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which directed the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (“NIST”) to develop a framework for reducing cyber risks to 
critical infrastructure.204 The result was a general framework aimed at helping 
organizations evaluate their current cyber security systems in order to meet cer-
tain goals and achieve a higher level of efficiency.205 This framework is purely 
voluntary and broadly applicable to any industry, but it is a good start.206  
There is potential for insurance companies to use something like the NIST 
framework to evaluate risk in cyber insurance policies.207 It has been suggested 
that insurers score policyholders based on the safeguards or objectives outlined 
in the framework.208 Based on the score given to company, the insurer could set 
a premium, how high the deductible should be, and how much coverage to ex-
tend.209 This type of guidance could be useful in the federal government’s role 
as a risk reducer, and could help create a set of standards for insurers to abide by 
in order to be eligible for federal reinsurance.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The ongoing rise of data breaches exposed the failure of our current system 
to address this problem. The newly emerging cyber insurance market is not ma-
ture enough to singlehandedly manage the risks posed by data breaches. Even if 
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the market were capable of handling these risks, the risk-spreading nature of in-
surance would not provide the incentives needed to reduce the nature of risk and 
mitigate its damages for the future. The federal government must take on a tem-
porary role as both risk shifter and risk reducer if it hopes to provide a meaning-
ful, long-lasting solution to this problem. Information sharing and regulatory 
guidelines can help accelerate the development of the market and set uniform 
standards from which insurers can demand compliance from policyholders. The 
very role of insurance must be refocused and only the federal government can 
help repurpose the insurance sector to provide a system-wide solution to data 
breach risk.  
